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FROM: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY

So MUCH FOR THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE CHALLENGE TO
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
BEING "FRIVOLOUS"
Randy Barnettt

R

emember when the Commerce Clause challenge to the individual insurance mandate was dismissed by all serious and
knowledgeable constitutional law professors and Nancy
Pelosi as "frivolous"? Well, as Jonathan notes below, the administration is now apparently telling the New York Times that the individual insurance "requirement" and "penalty" is really an exercise of the
Tax Power of Congress.
Administration officials say the tax argument is a linchpin of
their legal case in defense of the health care overhaul and its
individual mandate, now being challenged in court by more
than 20 states and several private organizations.

Let that sink in for a moment. If the Commerce Clause claim of
power were a slam dunk, as previously alleged, would there be any
need now to change or supplement that theory? Maybe the administration lawyers confronted the inconvenient fact that the Commerce Clause has never in history been used to mandate that all
Americans enter into a commercial relationship with a private company on pain of a "penalty" enforced by the IRS. So there is no Su-
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preme Court ruling that such a claim of power is constitutional. In
short, this claim of power is both factually and judicially unprecedented.
Remarkably, and to its credit, the NYT informs its readers about
2 key facts that pose a problem with the tax theory - and without
even attributing these to the measure's opponents.
Congress anticipated a constitutional challenge to the individual mandate. Accordingly, the law includes 10 detailed findings meant to show that the mandate regulates commercial ac-·
tivity important to the nation's economy. Nowhere does
Congress cite its taxing power as a source of authority.

And
The law describes the levy on the uninsured as a "penalty" rather than a tax.

This is a sign that NYT's reporter Robert Pear is on the ball. But
wait! There is more that is not in the article.
The Supreme Court has defined a tax as having a revenue raising
purpose - a requirement that is usually easy to satisfy. But in the
section of the act that specifically identifies all of its revenue raising
provisions for purposes of scoring its costs (which is a big deal), the
insurance mandate "penalty" goes unmentioned.
Unlike any other tax, according to the act, the failure to pay the
penalty "shall not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty
with respect to such failure." Nor shall the IRS "file notice of lien
with respect to any property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure
to pay the penalty imposed by this section," or "levy on any such
property with respect to such failure."
The article reports this response from the Justice Department:
The Justice Department brushes aside the distinction, saying
"the statutory label" does not matter. The constitutionality of
a tax law depends on "its practical operation," not the precise
form of words used to describe it, the department says, citing
a long line of Supreme Court cases.

Now there are cases that say ( 1) when Congress does not invoke
a specific power for a claim of power, the Supreme Court will look
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for a basis on which to sustain the measure; (2) when Congress does
invoke its Tax power, such a claim is not defeated by showing the
measure would be outside its commerce power if enacted as a regulation (though there are some older, never-reversed precedents
pointing the other way), and (3) the Courts will not look behind a
claim by Congress that a measure is a tax with a revenue raising
purpose.
But I have so far seen no case that says (4) when a measure is expressly justified in the statute itself as a regulation of commerce (as
the NYT accurately reports), the courts will look look behind that
characterization during litigation to ask if it could have been justified
as a tax, or (5) when Congress fails to include a penalty among all
the "revenue producing" measures in a bill, the Court will nevertheless impute a revenue purpose to the measure.
Now, of course, the Supreme Court can always adopt these two
additional doctrines. It could decide that any measure passed and
justified expressly as a regulation of commerce is constitutional if it
could have been enacted as a tax. But if it upholds this act, it would
also have to say that Congress can assert any power it wills over individuals so long as it delegates enforcement of the penalty to the
IRS. Put another way since every "fine" collects money, the Tax
Power gives Congress unlimited power to. fine any activity or, as
here, inactivity it wishes! (Do you doubt this will be a major line of
questioning in oral argument?)
But it gets still worse. For calling this a tax does not change the
nature of the "requirement" or mandate that is enforced by the
"penalty." ALL previous cases of taxes upheld (when they may have
exceeded the commerce power) involved "taxes" on conduct or activity. None involved taxes on the refusal to engage in conduct. In
short, none of these tax cases involved using the Tax Power to impose a mandate.
·
So, like the invocation of the Commerce Clause, this invocation
of the Tax Power is factually and judicially unprecedented. It is yet
another unprecedented claim of Congressional power. Only this
one is even more sweeping and dangerous than the Commerce
Clause theory.
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I responded to this theory in the Wall Street Journal back in
April, in an op-ed the editors entitled The Insurance Mandate in
1
Peril. Here is a key passage from my op-ed:
Supporters of the mandate cite U.S. v. Kahriser (1953), where
the Court upheld a punitive tax on gambling by saying that
"[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax need,
courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing
power." Yet the Court in Kahriser also cited Bailey with approval. The key to understanding Kahriser is the proposition
the Court there rejected: "it is said that Congress, under the
pretense of exercising its power to tax has attempted to penalize
illegal intrastate gambling through the regulatory features of
the Act" (emphasis added).
In other words, the Court in Kahriser declined to look behind Congress's assertion that it was exercising its tax power to
see whether a measure was really a regulatory penalty. As the
Court said in Sonzinsky v. U.S. (1937), "[i)nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power
constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of
courts." But this principle cuts both ways. Neither will the
Court look behind Congress's inadequate assertion of its commerce power to speculate as to whether a measure was "really"
a tax. The Court will read the cards as Congress dealt them.

My piece is not behind a subscription wall so interested readers
can read (or reread) the whole thing.
Now the usual caveat. Just because the constitutional challenge
to the health insurance mandate is not frivolous does not mean it
will prevail. The odds are always that the Supreme Court will uphold an
act if Congress. Given the wording of the Act, however, the implications of doing so using the Tax Power are so sweeping and dangerous that I doubt a majority of the Court would adopt this claim of
power on these facts.
But the argument is far from over. I I
I Randy E. Barnett, The Insurance Mandate in Peril: First Conaress said it was a reaulation <if
commerce. Now it's supposed to be a tax. Neither claim will survive Supreme Court scrutiny., Wall
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